As taught by the '09 Debian PGP disaster relating to DSA, the randomness source is extremely important. On systems without /dev/random, Crypt::DSA falls back to using Data::Random. Data::Random uses rand(), about which the perldoc says "rand() is not cryptographically secure. You should not rely on it in security-sensitive situations." In the case of DSA, this is even worse. Using improperly secure randomness sources can compromise the signing key upon signature of a message.
See: http://rdist.root.org/2010/11/19/dsa-requirements-for-random-k-value/
It might seem that this would not affect Linux since /dev/random is always available and so the fall back to Data::Random would never happen. However, if an application is confined using a MAC system such as SELinux then access to /dev/random could be denied by policy and the fall back would be triggered.
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